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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action rises out of the construction of a marina 
on Callville Bay, Lake Mead, Nevada, Defendant/Respondent being 
the owner and Marinas Internationale became the general 
contractor on December 14, 1984 (Amended Findings of Fact 
(Addendum D) "AF" paragraph 5). 
(a) On or about March 1, 1985, Marinas Internationale, 
the general contractor hired by Forever Living Products, 
Defendant/Respondent, (hereinafter "FLP") entered into a 
subcontract with Plaintiff/Appellant "Neilsen", entitled an 
"Installment Contract", whereby "Neilsen" was to perform services 
relative to the construction of the marina. (AF paragraph 8). 
(b) The base dollar amount for the construction of the 
marina per the general contract between "FLP" and Marinas 
Internationale was $2,083,760.00. The General Contract 
(hereinafter "Contract", Addendum A) also contained a mechanism 
whereby Marinas Internationale was to be paid an amount for 
anchoring the dock system, based upon actual cost, but not to 
exceed $101,740.00. After some storm damage occurred to the 
project, a change order added an additional $26,713.00 to the 
general contract amount. (AF paragraph 6). 
(c) The Installation Contract between Marinas 
Internationale and "Neilsen" required Marinas Internationale to 
pay "Neilsen" $150,696.00 for the installation of the dock, which 
was based on a price of $1.75 per square foot for 86,112 square 
feet of dock and to install the roof for a price of $304,900.00. 
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(AF paragraph 9 and Transcri pt "T" • " -^ :-'": .^ 
{ ::i) Oi i :: r a b o \ it M a r • :::1 1 - •..: . d e i I I I i 
contract between Marinas Internationale end Marina Mechanics was 
issued requi ri ng Marina Mechanics to fabr icate and provide 
certain anchor blocks oi 1 the marina at ai 1 add i tional cost I i» 
Marinas Internationale of $41,211.00'. (AF paragraph 11). 
:. '• ( e ) Be gi'i ni :i i i lg ; n 1:1 l tl i> B or J gj n, a ] ::Ic:>\( jri payment i n 
December of 1984, and coi itinuing through February, March, Apri 1 , 
May -: ri r- June 10, 1985, "FLP" paid a 1: .otal of $2,109,168.50 _j 
•;: e i: na t i o n a .1 e f o r iiia t e i: :i a 1 s !:  1 ie ^ t ho u gh t h a d b e e i I 
delivered to the site and for labor Invol ved In the construction 
of the projec I: (AF paragraph 1 2 ) . 
( £ ) Oi l oi about J \ n le 3 3 Il 985 l id J Liiidib 11 i t . e n i a l l u i u i I <'•:* 
the general contractor, filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the 
United States Bankruptcy Code. (AF paragraph 13). 
(g) Af ter tl: le bankr up l::c;y fi 1 ii lg, "Ne:i Ise i: i" i: e£i lsed t: : • 
perforin further work unless some measures were taken, to ensure 
paymen t t ::) 1 i :i ni f • :: r si id l M or 1 :  Oi i Ji ine 211 ] 985 a joi i l t: 
accommodation was reached among "Nellsen "' "FLP" and Marinas 
Internationale whereby "Neilsen" would be paid by joint check 
(payabJ e joi nt] ],< I: : "Nei ] sen11 and Mar i i las Inter nati oi la 1 e) base' i 
upon time and mater1 a 1 1 nvo1ces submi11ed "Ne11sen" proceeded 
and continue-: • jerf-^. work oi i this basis until August 26, 
1 - . 
(h) or; cr about July 9, 1985, • a severe storm arose i n 
the Lake Mead area and extensively damaged the marina, which was 
3 
still under construction at the time. 
(i) On or about August 26, 1985, "Neilsen" ceased 
performing construction work in Nevada. (AF paragraph 15). 
(j) On or about October 16, 1985, the Department of 
Interior submitted a letter to FLP acknowledging completion of 
the marina and giving its approval to open approximately one-half 
of the marina slips at the Callville Bay Marina. (AF paragraph 
18). 
(k) On or about January 6, 1986, the Department of the 
Interior, National Park Service submitted another letter to "FLP" 
giving its approval to open the completed marina. (AF paragraph 
19). 
(1) "Astros" contract was with "Neilsen" to supply 
steel structural materials for a roof structure over a portion of 
the docks, such contract being entered into after "Neilsen" 
contracted with Marinas Internationale. (T Vol. 3, pp 135-147). 
(ro) The original contract between "FLP" and Marinas 
Internationale and the "Installation Contract" between "Neilsen" 
and "FLP" contemplated third party beneficiaries. (AF paragraph 
8). 
(n) "Astro" had no obligation, contractually or 
otherwise, and did not do anything but supply materials to the 
construction site. "Astro" was a materialman only. (T. Vol 3, 
pp 135-147) . 
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ISSUES PRESENTED 
(a) Whether Respondent has been unjustly enriched by 
Appellants. The trial court found insufficient evidence for 
Neilsen1s unjust enrichment claim. However, the record 
substantiates that there is more than sufficient evidence to 
support said claim and the Court erred in its judgment on this 
issue. 
(b) Whether "Neilsen", as a third-party beneficiary 
under the terms of the lease entered into between "FLP" and the 
Department of Interior or the contract referred to above is 
subject to all defenses that could be raised! as against Marinas 
Internationale. 
(c) Whether or not the evidence supports a finding 
that no oral agreements were made by "FLP" to Appellant 
"Neilsen." 
(d) Whether "FLP's" negligence in administering its 
contract with Marinas Internationale resulted in damage 
compensable to "Neilsen." 
(e) Whether "Astro" was damaged by the negligence of 
"FLP," other than economically, in "FLP's" Administration of its 
contract. 
(f) Whether "Astro," as a materialman only, "steps 
into the shoes" of the contractor, or subcontractor and is 
subject to all defenses "FLP" could raise as against a contractor 
or subcontractor. 
5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Plaintiff/Appellant in this case, Ronald Neilsen 
d/b/a Marina Mechanics (hereinafter "Neilsen), is asserting a 
number of claims against the Defendant/Respondent Forever Living 
Products (hereinafter "FLP"). First, Neilsen is arguing that FLP 
was unjustly enriched by the work performed by Neilsen during the 
initial contract period prior to the bankruptcy of Marinas 
Internationale (hereinafter "MI"), for work performed during the 
second contract period from June 13 through July 9, when a storm 
damaged the construction project, and the third contractual 
period of approximately July 12 through August 26, 1985 when 
Neilsen was removed from the project, FLP claims that it was 
unjustly enriched because it paid the full contract price. 
Neilsen asserts the full contract price was paid to the wrong 
individuals and this improper payment was due to FLP's 
incompetency and, therefore, the payment should not be considered 
a defense, 
Neilsen also argues that due to its third-party 
beneficiary status it can recover against FLP. The Court found 
that Neilsen had third-party beneficiary status, but also found 
that FLP could assert the liquidated damages delay provision of 
the Contract against Neilsen and, therefore, Neilsen could 
recover nothing. Neilsen asserts that particular provision of 
the contract should not be applied to him based on the 
impossibility of performance which was created by FLP. Neilsen 
also asserts that FLP waived its right to assert the liquidated 
6 
damages provision by continuing to pay MI even though MI was in 
breach of the completion date of the Contract. Neilsen asserts 
that the liquidated damage provision was waived by FLP under the 
terms of the Contract, specifically paragrapjh 23.3 when it made 
its final payment to MI on June 10, 1985. This waiver then would 
preclude the assertion of the liquidated damages provision 
against Nielsen or Astro Steel. 
Neilsen also asserts that there wds an oral agreement 
made between FLP and Neilsen to recoup Neils|en's losses to MI. 
The Trial Court ruled that such an oral agreement was within the 
Nevada Statute of Frauds and, therefore, precluded a finding that 
Neilsen could recover. Neilsen argues that the oral agreement 
for recoupment of his losses was an inducement to have Neilsen 
continue on the project and to see the project to completion. 
Neilsen argues that part performance and FLP's inducement takes 
the agreement out of the Statute of Frauds and would allow 
Neilsen to recover his damages. 
Lastly, Neilsen argues that he wa$ injured through 
FLP's negligent administration of the contract. The Court found 
that economic loss is not recoverable. However, Neilsen asserts 
that the growing trend in cases of this natiire is to allow 
recovery for economic loss and that under the circumstances of 
this case, particularly with the language of the contract, it 




DEFENDANT FOREVER LIVING PRODUCTS WAS UNJUSTLY 
ENRICHED BY THE WORK OF THE PLAINTIFF RONALD 
NEILSEN D/B/A MARINA MECHANICS DUE TO FOREVER 
LIVING PRODUCT'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE PAYMENT FOR 
THE WORK PERFORMED BY NEILSEN AND BY FAILING TO 
TAKE ADEQUATE STEPS TO SEE THAT PAYMENTS MADE FOR 
SAID WORK WERE PAID TO SUBCONTRACTORS AS REQUIRED 
BY THE CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN FOREVER LIVING 
PRODUCTS AND MARINAS INTERNATIONALE. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
It has been urged by Defendant Forever Living Products 
("FLP") that this case is a simple question of "a contractor 
going bad" and leaving a subcontractor without payment. 
Unfortunately, this matter is not that simple. There are a 
number of factors which complicate the contractual arrangement 
and the issues. As set forth in the Statement of Facts, this 
project, at least as far as Neilsen is concerned, involved three 
separate contract terms. The original written contract between 
FLP and MI was essentially suspended on June 13, 1985 when MI 
took out bankruptcy. At that time, FLP reached an accommodation 
with MI and Neilsen for the completion of the work. There is no 
indication that the terms of the original contract were ever 
incorporated into the accommodation. This occurred on or about 
June 21, 1985. 
Subsequent to the accommodation, the project was 
severally damaged by a windstorm on Callville Bay. This required 
further modifications of any "contracts" that were in existence 
8 
at that time. That effectively ended the second contractual 
period and began the third contractual period with Neilsen being 
paid on invoices submitted on a weekly basi$. (T. Vol. II, pp 
40-45). 
Forever Living Products holds itself out to be a simple 
customer seeking to have a project built and not receiving the 
benefit of its contract. What FLP fails to present is the fact 
that on June 13, 1987 when MI filed for bankruptcy, FLP had 
already breached the written agreement. 
The written agreement required FLlf to meet a certain 
payment schedule and to see that subcontractors were adequately 
compensated (Addendum A) . Neither had takeiji place on June 10 
when FLP made the final payment on the Contract (T. Vol IV, pp 
121-145). Based on the language of the Contract, subcontractors 
had a right to rely on the terms of that agreement. (Addendum 
A). 
In paying out the full amount und^r the Contract to 
Marinas Internationale, in violation of the terms of the 
contract, the subcontractors, specifically Neilsen and Astro 
Steel, were injured. FLP also breached the contract in allowing 
MI to miss the scheduled completion dates of May 1 and June 1 
without asserting its rights for liquidated damages. In the 
proceeding against it, FLP claimed that the liquidated damages it 
failed to assert against Marinas Internationale should somehow 
now be asserted against Neilsen and Astro Steel as third-party 
beneficiaries. From the testimony of Tom M^ce (T. Vol. IV, pp 
121-45), it is clear that the only thing FLP was concerned about 
was getting its marina completed; even if the completion, and the 
means of accomplishing that goal, were detrimental to the rights 
and obligations it owed to subcontractors. 
B, FOREVER LIVING PRODUCTS WAS UNJUSTLY ENRICHED 
BY THE WORK PERFORMED BY NEILSEN BOTH PRIOR AND 
SUBSEQUENT TO THE BANKRUPTCY OF MARINAS INTERNATIONALE 
AND PRIOR TO THE JOINT ACCOMMODATION, 
1. Legal Standard 
The doctrine of unjust enrichment is, in effect, the 
creation of a contract where none existed. FLP insists that 
Neilsen has no contractual rights against it under the agreement. 
Neilsen asserts that he in fact does have certain rights under 
the contract, but if this Court should rule that he didn't, the 
doctrine of unjust enrichment would apply to the circumstances. 
The legal standard for unjust enrichment has been clearly set out 
by the Supreme Court of Nevada in Unionamerica Mortgage and 
Equity Trust v. McDonald, 626 P.2d 1272 (Nev. 1981). In the 
Unionamerica case, the Court indicates that the purpose of this 
kind of relief is to "do justice to the parties regardless of 
their intention, Trollope v. Koerner, 470 P.2d 91 (1970)," at 
1273. 
In this case, Neilsen maintains that FLP's intent in 
the original agreement was to confer benefits and protections 
upon subcontractors. However, even if that were not the intent 
of the parties, the doctrine of unjust enrichment would apply and 
Neilsen can recover for work performed. 
In the Unionamerica case, the Court, in citing Pass v. 
10 
E p p l e n , 424 P . 2 d 779 , 780 ( C o l o . 1 9 6 7 ) , saicil: 
"The essential elements of quasi Contract are a 
benefit conferred on the defendant by the plaintiff, 
appreciation by the defendant of $uch benefit and 
acceptance and retention by the defendant under 
circumstances such that it would be inequitable for 
him to retain the benefit without payment of the 
value thereof." 
This can then be broken down into the four elements as 
set forth above: (1) A benefit to Defendant; (2) Appreciation 
by the Defendant of the benefit; (3) Acceptance by the Defendant 
of such a benefit; (4) Retention of the behefit under 
circumstances that would be inequitable. It is clear from the 
standards as set forth by the Court that th^ factual 
circumstances of each case will make the critical difference in 
determining whether or not unjust enrichment has occurred and 
whether Plaintiff can recover from said unjiist enrichment. 
2. Factual Standard. 
As stated above, the Court must m&ke a factual 
determination in each individual case to determine if the 
equities require recovery under the doctrihe of unjust 
enrichment, see Costanso v. Stewart, 453 P.^d 526 (Ariz. 1969); 
Paschall's Inc. v. Dosier, 407 S.W.2d 150 (Tenn. 1966) and the 
related discussions in 62 ALR 3rd 288. 
In this case, the Appellant does not challenge the 
trial court's findings of fact as to the claim itself because 
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court's fihdings establish a 
claim for unjust enrichment. The Appellant does assert, however, 
that the Court misapplied the facts to the 3-aw and therefore the 
11 
judgment and ruling must be reversed. 
It is undisputed that Neilsen performed a substantial 
amount of work on FLP's Callville Bay project. It is also 
undisputed that work was performed by Neilsen from March 11, 1985 
through and including June 13, 1985, the date MI filed for 
bankruptcy, (see Amended Findings of Fact paragraphs 10, 11 and 
14) and subsequent to that date to August 26, 1985. 
Defendant cannot assert that it was not enriched by the 
work performed by Neilsen. By June 10, 1985, fully thirty to 
forty percent of the Marina installation had been completed. 
This was not in compliance with the terms of the contract; 
however, FLP made no assertions as to its rights under liquidated 
damages provisions at that time or at any other time prior to 
trial. There is also no dispute that FLP appreciated the work 
performed by Neilsen in that by June 10, 1985, FLP had in fact 
paid out the full contract price to Marinas Internationale. One 
has to assume that FLP would not have paid out the contract price 
had the work not been appreciated. The key issue of dispute then 
is whether or not FLP's failure to pay the amount requested by 
Defendant as set forth in Plaintiff's Exhibit 25 and invoices is 
inequitable. 
3. FLP's Retention of the Work Performed 
By Neilsen Without Paying as Asserted by Neilsen 
at Trial was Inequitable. 
In this case, FLP has asserted that it was not unjustly 
enriched in that it paid out the full contract price for the work 
that was performed. In fact, FLP asserts that it paid out more 
12 
than the full contract price for the work performed. This may 
normally be an adequate defense as to the folurth factor set out 
in Unionamerica, but for the fact that FLP's payments were 
improper and in violation of the terms of thle contractual 
agreement. 
As set forth earlier, FLP had an obligation to 
subcontractors to see that payment was made. FLP was also 
obligated to a certain payment schedule in the agreement, and 
based on the language of paragraph 20 in said agreement, 
subcontractors had a right to rely on FLP's adherence to the 
schedule. By June 10, 1985, even though the work was only thirty 
to forty percent complete and even though Ml was a full forty 
days late in completing the project with absolutely no hope of 
completing the project in the near future, #LP made the final 
payment on the contract. This in effect ended any possibility 
that the subcontractors would ever receive payment. 
This was done with the knowledge that the marina was 
only thirty to forty percent complete. FLP had an agent on site 
who was verifying shipment of materials. However, this agent 
either failed to properly notify FLP or FLP ignored the fact 
regarding completion. Therefore, equities would dictate that 
FLP, by failing to live up to its own payment schedule and 
contractual obligations, did not merely "pay for the contract" 
but rather over paid MI and failed to pay tfye appropriate 
parties. Because of its breach of obligations, FLP cannot assert 
that payment has been made. This makes no more sense than 
13 
allowing an individual to assert a defense against a creditor by 
claiming that it paid to much to another creditor. Therefore, 
FLP has been unjustly enriched and Neilsen has been damaged as 
set forth in his testimony and exhibits. The Court's ruling on 




NEILSEN AND FOREVER LIVING PRODUCES ENTERED 
INTO AN ENFORCEABLE ORAL AGREEMENT IN WHICH 
FOREVER LIVING PRODUCTS AGREED TO PAY THOSE SUMS 
DUE NEILSEN THAT WERE NOT PAID BY MARINAS 
INTERNATIONALE AS REQUIRED UNDER THE CONTRACTS 
AND CHANGE ORDERS. 
On June 21, 1985, the Defendant FLp entered into an 
accommodation with the Plaintiff Neilsen and MI. As part of this 
joint accommodation, Neilsen was to remain on site and complete 
the work that MI had failed to complete. This accommodation 
included an oral agreement by FLP to pay for the unpaid debts 
owed by Marinas Internationale to Neilsen. The evidence 
regarding these items were testified to by Rjon Neilsen and are 
contained in Volume 1 of the transcript, pages 84-92. 
FLP has set forth that the oral promise to pay for 
another is barred by the Nevada Statute of Frauds, N.R.S. 
111.220. It is true that the Statute of Frauds does apply to the 
situation where one agrees to answer to that of another. 
However, there are certain circumstances under which the Court 
will remove the oral contract from the statute of frauds. In 
this case, FLP used the oral agreement to rqpay losses as an 
inducement to keep Neilsen on site and to eater into the 
accommodation to continue work. 
This period constitutes the second contractual period 
involved in the project. Neilsen did in fac^ t rely upon the 
statements made by FLP and agreed to the accommodation. He also 
continued work on the project under the terms of the 
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accommodation. 
Nevada case law recognizes that, under the Statute of 
Frauds, certain equities can be taken into account to prevent 
inequitable results due to oral agreements. In Zunino v. 
Paramore, 435 P.2d 196 (Nev. 1967), the Nevada Supreme Court 
indicated that an agreement normally required to be in writing 
could be taken out of the Statute of Frauds if elements exist 
which amount to part performance. In a previous case, Harmon v. 
Tanner Motor Tours of Nevada Ltd., 377 P.2d 622 (Nev. 1963), the 
Court ruled that in that particular situation, if there was only 
a promise to reduce an agreement to writing, it was insufficient 
to take the agreement out of the Statute of Frauds. The Court 
went on further to indicate that part performance alone was also 
insufficient to remove an oral agreement from the Statute of 
Frauds. However, the Court then ruled that a combination of the 
promise to reduce to writing and part performance would be 
sufficient to remove the oral agreement from the statute. 
In the case before us, Neilsen testified he entered 
into an oral agreement with FLP in which FLP would pay the sum 
due from MI (see Exhibit 25, Addendum B) and would continue to 
pay Neilsen to complete the Marina. FLP agreed to reduce the 
agreement to writing and did so as to the ongoing work. Based 
upon the agreements, Neilsen continued to perform work for FLP 
until August 26, 1985. This continued work clearly shows the 
part performance both on the part of Neilsen and on the part of 
FLP in furtherance of their oral and subsequent written 
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agreement. 
In a later case, Schreiber v. Schrpiber, 663 P.2d 1189 
(Nev. 1983), the Supreme Court of Nevada determined that part 
performance alone would be sufficient to rembve the oral 
agreement from the Statue of Frauds. FLP induced Neilsen into 
the agreement to continue work by orally agreeing to pay for 
expenses incurred that were due him from MarfLnas Internationale. 
The other occurrence that would tajce an oral agreement 
out of the Statute of Frauds is detrimental reliance upon 
representations made by FLP. Neilsen clearly stayed on the job 
even though he could have left and perhaps had other paying 
contracts. He took FLP at its word and belifeved that the Company 
would make up the losses suffered at the hands of MI. This 
detrimental reliance is one more factor in removing the oral 
agreement from the Statute of Frauds. See Ajlpark Distributing 
Company v. Poole, 600 P.2d 229 (Nev. 1979). 
While it may be argued that FLP did nothing but remain 
silent regarding its agreement to recoup loSiSes incurred by 
Neilsen, the Nevada Court has ruled that sil|ence can be just as 
crucial a factor as assent. In fact, it stajted 
that "... The principal is obligated to exercise due care and to 
conduct himself as a reasonably prudent busilness person with 
normal regard for the interest of others", Goldstein v. Hanna, 
635 P.2d 290, 292 (Nev. 1981). 
Careful review of the testimony presented in the 
transcript will show that the trial court clearly erred in 
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determining that there was an oral agreement that was bound by 
the Statute of Frauds. The representations by FLP regarding the 
repayment or recouping of losses from MI induced Neilsen to 
remain upon a job to his detriment. There was sufficient 
testimony to establish the amount of damages owed under the oral 
representation. FLP's conduct clearly takes the oral agreement 
out of the Statute of Frauds and creates an enforceable agreement 
between the parties. 
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Ill 
NEILSEN, AS A THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY, IS 
NOT BARRED FROM RECOVERY DUE TO THE BREACH OF 
MARINAS INTERNATIONALE. 
A. NEILSEN IS NOT SUBJECT TO EVERY DEFENSE FLP 
COULD ASSERT AGAINST MI. 
FLP has correctly asserted the general rule in third-
party beneficiary cases. The Oklahoma Court in Britton v. Groom, 
373 P.2d 1012 (Okla. 1962) stated "a third-party beneficiary who 
seeks to enforce a contract does so subject to the defenses that 
would be valid as between the parties." However, in Morelli v. 
Morelli, 720 P.2d 704 (Nev. 1986), the Court, after citing 
Britton v. Groom, determined that the general rule is not always 
applicable. 
In the Morelli case, a contract existed between an 
individual and his former wife. This contractual agreement 
involved tuition for their minor child to attend college. The 
former wife breached the agreement. Howeve^, the Morelli court 
held that the child, upon reaching the age of majority, could 
enforce the contract as the third-party beneficiary. When the 
father asserted the defense that was created by the former wife's 
non-performance, the Court determined that $ince the former wife 
was dead, it was impossible for her to perform that portion of 
the contract and allowed the third-party beneficiary to enforce 
the contract even though the defense of nonperformance or breach 
was "available." 
Therefore, in Morelli, the Court ^ound that the general 
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rule is not applicable in all cases. If the party that was to 
perform or the individual third-party beneficiary couldn't 
perform the obligations under the contract, the general rule 
cannot apply. This impossibility to perform, in effect, 
discharges that portion of the contract that is impossible to 
perform. 
In this case, it is clear that Astro Steel does not and 
did not have the expertise to complete the project. Therefore, 
it would be impossible for Astro Steel to perform the contract. 
Any failure of performance is discharged by Astrofs impossibility 
to perform and therefore the liquidated damages defense is not 
available. 
A similar argument holds true as to Neilsen. Neilsen 
could not perform on the installation contract due to a number of 
breaches by FLP. Under the terms of the contract, FLP had an 
obligation to monitor the payments and the delivery of materials 
to the site. Due to FLP's failure to properly monitor delivery 
and payment (testimony of Tom Mace, supra), Neilsen was unable to 
complete the project. Sufficient material to complete the marina 
was never on site prior to the completion dates as set forth by 
FLP. 
Had FLP properly monitored the contract with its on 
site agent, Neilsen may have been able to perform the contract 
and not have lapsed into a delay situation. This failure by FLP 
made the contract impossible to perform and, therefore, the 
defense raised by FLP is discharged and not applicable to the 
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third-party beneficiary Neilsen. 
B. NEILSEN IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE LIQUIDATED 
DAMAGES BECAUSE FLP WAIVED ITS RIGHTS TO 
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES BY CONTINUING TO MAKE PAYMENTS 
AFTER MI WAS IN BREACH OF THE CONTRACT. 
1. FLP Waived Its Rights to Assert the 
Liguidated Damages Claus^. 
In paragraph 2 3.3 of the Contract, the Contract 
indicates that: 
"The making of final payments shall constitute a 
waiver of all claims by the customer except those 
arising from (1) unsettled liens; 1(2) faulty or 
defective work appearing after substantial 
completion; (3) failure of the work to comply with 
the requirements of the contract documents; or (4) 
terms of any special warranties required by the 
contract documents." 
When FLP made the final payment to MI on Jurle 10, 1985, it waived 
its rights to any of the liquidated damages pursuant to the terms 
of paragraph 23.3. It may be argued that the delay is a "failure 
of the work to comply with the requirements of the contract 
documents" but without specific language referring to delay, 
Neilsen asserts that that provision of the qontract does not 
apply. 
While FLP may not have waived its liquidated damages 
rights in writing, conduct can be just as important as any 
written agreement. In fact, the waiver can !easily be inferred 
from the conduct of FLP in this situation. At no time was any 
testimony presented that FLP asserted any oi the clauses set 
forth in paragraph 23.3 as to MI or any other party. FLP made 
its final payments and this conduct clearly puts it within the 
confines of paragraph 23.3, see Udevco, Inc. v. Wagonerf 678 P.2d 
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679 (Nev. 1984). 
Even if the provisions did not exist in the contract in 
paragraph 23.3, an owner can implicitly waive its liquidated 
damages rights by continuing to make payments and making the 
final payment under the contract, E.V. Cox Construction Co. vs. 
Brookline Associates, 604 P.2d 816 (Okla. App. 1979). By its own 
evidence, FLP paid out a substantial amount of money to MI after 
MI was already in breach of the completion date provision. There 
is no evidence to suggest that FLP ever asserted its liquidated 
damages right against MI let alone prior to making its final 
payment. 
2. FLPfs Conduct Interfered With Neilsen's 
Ability to Perform on the Contract and Therefore, 
FLP is Estopped From Asserting the Defense. 
FLP was responsible for a number of obligations under 
the contract. FLP was responsible for monitoring the progress 
and seeing that payments were made only under the schedule as 
progress was made. FLP's failure to monitor these correctly 
prevented on-time deliver of steel and materials which, in turn, 
interfered with Neilsenfs ability to finish the marina. 
FLP *s payments were in breach of the contract and 
removed all incentive of MI to fulfill the obligations of the 
contract. This in turn impeded Neilsen's ability to complete the 
contract. In that FLP contributed to the delay through its 
conduct, it cannot assert that delay as a basis for collection of 
damages, see Higgins v. City of Fillmore, 639 P.2d 192 (Utah 
1981). FLP should have been or was well aware of the delays and 
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made no attempts whatsoever to take corrective action. 
Therefore, the liquidated damage clause should not be applied to 
third-party beneficiaries. 
C. FLP CANNOT ASSERT LIQUIDATED DAMAGE CLAIMS 
SINCE THE CONTRACT WAS EFFECTIVELY TERMINATED 
BY THE ACCOMMODATION REACHED ON JUNE 21, 1985 AND 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO INDICATE THAT THE COMPLETION 
DATE REQUIREMENTS BECAME PART OF THE ACCOMMODATION. 
As stated above, the parties FLP, MI and Neilsen 
entered into an accommodation on June 21, 1985. As part of that 
accommodation, FLP was to issue joint check^ to MI and Neilsen 
based upon Neilsen1s weekly invoicing. At ho time during the 
testimony or trial of this case was any evidence presented that 
the completion date requirements ever became part of that 
accommodation. Neilsen asserts that the accommodation became a 
substitute for the contract without specific language regarding 
completion dates and liquidated damages; therefore, those 
provisions were no longer in effect and were unenforceable. 
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IV 
NEILSEN HAS BEEN INJURED BY FLP•S NEGLIGENT 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE CONTRACT WITH MI. 
FLP entered into a contract with MI and had a set 
payment schedule contained within the contract. In making the 
payments through June 10, 1985, FLP breached the terms of its 
agreement and negligently administered the contract to the 
detriment of the subcontractors. The losses experienced by the 
subcontractors were economic losses, but Neilsen asserts that the 
new trend in tort law is to allow recovery for economic loss 
under circumstances such as these. 
A. FLP OWED A DUTY TO NEILSEN, ASTRO STEEL 
AND ALL OTHER SUBCONTRACTORS AND MATERIALMEN 
TO ACT REASONABLY AND RESPONSIBLY. 
The language in paragraph 20 of the Contract creates an 
obligation to subcontractors. In paragraph 20, the agreement 
creates the duty to act reasonably and responsibly. The entire 
contract agreement, while not between Neilsen and FLP, clearly 
contemplated the use of subcontractors. In fact, paragraph 20 
gives the owner the opportunity to refuse to allow certain 
subcontractors to perform work. This veto power creates even 
more of an obligation between the subcontractors and the owners 
than a usual contract. 
This duty of due care is a standard tort requirement 
for finding of negligence. Normally, in order for finding of 
negligence, the Court must find that there was a duty, a breach 
of that duty, proximate cause and damages. This is true even 
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though the relationship comes out of a contractual relationship, 
see Section 93 of W. Prosser, The Law of Toffts (4th Edition, 
1971); D.C.R., Inc. v. Peak Alarm Company, ^63 P.2d 433 (Utah 
1983); Meece v. Brigham Young University, 639 P.2d 720 (Utah 
1981); and Williams v. City of North Las Ve^as, 541 P.2d 652 
(Nev. 1975). 
In this case, Neilsen was injured due to FLPfs failure 
to exercise the degree of care which a reasonable person would 
have exercised under the same circumstances. Specifically, FLP 
negligently administered the contract by making payments to MI 
when it knew MI to be in breach of the completion clause of the 
contract and substantially behind in the woifk performed. This 
negligence continued when FLP made the final payment on the 
contract while the work was only thirty to forty percent 
completed. 
B. PRIVITY IS NOT NECESSARY FOR NEILSEN TO 
RECOVER FOR ECONOMIC LOSS UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CA$E. 
The Trial Court held that, without privity, Neilsen 
could not recover under a negligence theory for economic loss. 
This is not supported by the law of Nevada 9r of surrounding 
states. In the Williams case cited above, the Nevada Court found 
that even though the injured party was a sttanger to the 
contract, he could recover. In addition, bd>th the courts of 
Arizona and Colorado have determined that the contractual 
obligation is not necessarily the requirement for recovery, see 
Metropolitan Gas Repair Service, Inc. v. Ku^ak, 621 P.2d 313 
25 
(Colo. 1980); Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Wheeler, 663 P.2d 1041 
(Colo. 1983); and Brown v. Martin Marietta Corp., 690 P.2d 889 
(Colo. App. 1984). 
The Idaho courts have perhaps taken this further in 
ruling directly on the issue of privity and economic loss, the 
Idaho court in State v. Mitchell Construction Company, 699 P.2d 
1349 (Idaho 1985) specifically ruled that privity of contract is 
not required in a contract action to recover economic loss. 
This, combined with the D.C.R. case, indicates that the growing 
trend among the courts is to bypass the privity requirement 
particularly when dealing with subcontractors, contractors and 
owners. 
It may make good sense to require privity when a third-
party stranger is injured only economically as a result of 
negligence in the administration of a contract. However, that 
was not the case here. Neilsen was not a stranger third-party. 
He was a subcontractor that specifically had to be approved by 
both the owner and MI. This approval requirement may even have 
created the privity Defendant/Respondent claims is necessary in 
an economic loss negligence action. However, Neilsen maintains 
under the law of D.C.R., Williams and the other cases cited, 
privity is no longer a requirement in contractor, subcontractor 
or owner cases and respectfully requests the court to remand this 
action for further hearing on the issue of negligence. 
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performing the actual work were properly paid as required by 
paragraph 20 of the Contract. Further, Neilsen performed 
additional work after the accommodation agreement for which he 
was not paid. FLP claims that they paid an invoice amount; 
however, the testimony does not support that they paid the full 
amount of those invoices. 
If Neilsen is a third-party beneficiary, which the 
Trial Court found, he is not subject to all defenses that can be 
raised by FLP. FLP cannot claim that, due tjo Mi's failure to 
meet the completion date, Neilsen should be barred from 
collecting damages. This is true for several reasons, not the 
least of which is the fact that, by the time| FLP asserted any of 
these claims, it was impossible for Neilsen !to complete the 
project. Also, FLP clearly waived its rights to assert the 
liquidated damages provisions, both by its conduct in breaching 
the contract and by making the final payment as provided for in 
paragraph 23.3 of the Contract. 
While the Trial Court felt that the oral agreements 
between Neilsen and FLP were bound by the Stlatute of Frauds, they 
clearly were not. Actions by FLP and Neils4n both removed the 
oral agreements from the Statute of Frauds. The part performance 
by Neilsen and FLP and the inducement by FLP to have Neilsen to 
continue on the job were just such actions. Both acting together 
removed the oral agreements from the Statute of Frauds and render 
them enforceable. The question of damages under the oral 
agreement was submitted by Neilsen and not controverted. 
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C. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT TESTIMONY TO 
ESTABLISH FLP' S NEGLIGENCE IN ADMINISTERING 
THE CONTRACT. 
During the trial of this action, two experts testified 
regarding FLP's administration of the contract, (T. Vol. 2 pp 
102-149). In this testimony, both experts essentially agreed 
that FLP's payment to MI prior to its completion of the work and 
at the stake at which it had been completed were not proper. At 
the conclusion of the testimony that was presented, the Court 
refused to allow further testimony regarding issues of damages 
and ruled that the recovery under negligence for economic loss 
was not appropriate. Therefore, this Court should remand this 
case to the Trial Court on the issues of the establishment of 
damages of economic loss. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Neilsen has more than adequately set forth that this 
case is not a simple contractor gone bad case. There were 
numerous issues involved, including the questions of third-party 
beneficiaries, unjust enrichment, negligence and oral contracts. 
Neilsen has meet his burden on all of these issues. 
As to the question of unjust enrichment, Neilsen 
submits that it is FLP who made the mistake and cannot hide 
behind its own incompetence in paying out the contract price to 
MI while not properly supervising either the work or delivery of 
materials. Had FLP properly supervised its work, it would not 
have paid out the amount of money it claims to have paid. 
Rather, it would have seen that subcontractors who were 
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employee on site to 
FLP's negligent administration of its own contract 
resulted in a substantial loss to Neilsen and to others. FLP was 
negligent in paying MI the full contract prilce when the marina 
was only thirty to forty percent complete an^ l not all materials 
had been delivered to the site. FLP had an 
verify delivery and work. However, he faileld to do so. Under 
the circumstances, the claim by FLP that privity is necessary for 
recovery of an economic loss under a theory lof negligence is 
incorrect. The trend in the case law is to allow recovery where 
there is a relationship even if that relatidnship does not amount 
to privity. 
Neilsen respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
Trial Court and enter judgment on the issues of unjust 
enrichment, defenses to third-party beneficiaries and/or his oral 
agreement with FLP. As to the claim for negligence, Neilsen 
respectfully requests this Court to remand t;he case for trial on 
the issue of damages alone. 
Respectfully submitted this day of June, 1988. 
P. Gary Ferrero 
Attorney for Ronald K. Neilsen 
d/b/a Marina Mechanics 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
29 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant Ronald K. Neilsen d/b/a 
Marina Mechanics Enterprises, to the following, this day of 
June, 1988: 
George A. Hunt 
Ryan E. Tibbets 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
Attorneys for Respondents 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
J. Ray Barrios, P.C. 
Mueller, Barrios & Christensen 
Attorney for Appellant Astro Steel Corp. 
777 Clark Learning Center 
17 5 South West Temple 




ADDENDUM "A" - CONTRACT BETWEEN MARINAS INTERNATIONALE & FOREVER 
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P n l l v m ^ ttny Mnrinn 
•Hnv 100 Sf.nr B t . 10 
City Lns! Vpfras s t a t* H**_ ziP 89124 
Country HSA 
Contact Phone( ) 
PRODUCT 
Marinas Internationale, Ltd. (Company) agrees to provide the following 
materials and equipment according to the attached specifications ar-: 
marina plan entitled Cnllvillo Bav Marina - 12/7/84 (annrox.79.p00 SQ 
ana in accordance with the WOKK AND UULIVIIRV SiCMMDULE. 
PRICE 




0Laminated marina decking, 
thickness to be 4 * 
Price 
•Polyethylene pontoons, 
freeboard to be 16"-17' 




°0ther necessary hardware, 
per plan 
fcj'Kjways ( s p e c i f y ) : 
U t i l i t i e s : 
Other- A n chorint? 
Assembly & I n s t a l l a t i o n 
Hoof T&ttnlcture per plan 
TotJal 
not i:ic1'j'!c»f! 
$1 ,776 ,085 .00 
not i nc luded 
113 f7107q0 
included TOTAL 
Fre ight ( c i r c l e ) C.X»F.< C6F, F.O.p. 
Cotwaon Carr i er , F . A - S . r C.0«D., a t 






Concord. CA • Fl Myers. Ft • Chicago. It * St. toui* MO • Mew York. NY • 
Australia • Bahrain • Hong Kong « Kuwait • Saudi Arabia * United Arab 
-?-
Date December 10, 198^ Project Name Callvllle Bay Marina 
WORK AND DELIVERY SCHEDULE 
Work 
Materials begin to arrive at 
job site within 
Detail design complete and 
assembly begins 
Breakwater, C, D, and E piers 
completed to allow for boat 
rentals - (approx. 5/1 assuming 
12/12/8*1 contract execution) -
MI portion only. Does not 
account for utilities 
installation 










30 days from contract execution 
i<5 days from contract execution 
150 days from contract execution 
lHU) 'lays from contract execution 
Upon These Conditions 
Initial deposit, Indicating execution 
of contract 
Due pur payment terms as materials 










Due per terras as work In completed 
Due upon final completion 
Total amount of contract $2,01*3,760.00. 
The Customer shall make progress payments to the Company as 
follows: 10% down with order and Irrevocable {letter of credit In favor 
of Marinas Internationale, Ltd. wlt;h authorized draws based on receipt 
of materials and work* performed. Tin- Custome|r will be Invoiced upon 
the Contractor issuing purchase orders. Howulver, payment shall be due 
i 
7 days after materials arrive on site or upon arrival at a mutually 
ernent of values which will 
asc orders. If payment is 
contract price snail, 
mined J ate payment, be 
agreed upon storage area, according to a stat 
be issued at the time contractor 1SMI»?S purch) 
•itlayed beyond ten (l'>) days of whrn due, tin 
without prejudice to the Company's right to 1 
Increased by 1 1/2% per month on the- unpaid balance, but not to exceed 
the maximum amount permitted by law. Owner cigr^cs to provide bank 
references and/or financial statements as Company may require. All 
prices quoted are valid for ninety (90) days] 
5. DELAYS 
The Company shall be excused for. delay., in performance due to any f 
cause "beyond Its control, Including tout''hot''limited to fire, flood, act* 
of God, war, act of government, act *or .orpflaslon of Customer, strlke^orj 
labor trouble. The time of performance sfiall be extended for a time F 
. , . . . . ;.*.*•?.. — *-
equal to the period of the delay and It^^ri^equences. 
6. TITLE AMU INSURANCE 
Title to the products and risk of loss or damage shall pass to 
Buyer upon tender of delivery, except that a security Interest In the 
product or any replacement shall remain In Company, regardless of mode 
of attachment to realty or other property, until the full price has 
been paid In cash. Buyer agrees to do all acts necessary to perfect 
and maintain said security Interest, and to protect Company's Interest 
by adequately Insuring the product(s) against loss or damage from any 
external cause with Company named as Insured or co-Insured. Marinas 
Internationale agrees to pay the deductible for any such claims, 
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- STOJRAGJE COSTS 
Any part of the marina product which must be stored due to delay 
caused by the Customer will be placed in storage by the Company at cost 
and risk to the Customer 
8. WARRANTY 
The Company warrants to the Customer that the following materials 
supplied by the Company will be free from defects under normal use and 
service for a period of five (5) years from date of installation: 
fender, foam, bolts, cleats, anchoring guides, and a ten (10) year 
warranty on the pontoons. Company will furnish, repair or replace 
without cost to the Customer any part, assembly or portion thereof 
which shall be determined to be defective. The laminated plank carries 
a 30 year limited warranty against decay which Is provided by the 
manufacturer of the preservative treatment. The Company provides a 5 
year warranty against defects in the laminated plank provided 
ie express warranty of the 
recommended maintenance Is I'ol |nw<nl. (See Specifications for 
r ncnrnrnendod ma 1 n tenanre details). The Company provides a 5 year 
warrant,v on the roof materials and design. Other, separately listed 
Items swrh as utilities products and components, gangways, pilings and 
other accessories shall be covered only by t 
I'lanufniMiirer or supplier thereof. Thp Compapy will not be responsible 
Vov conspquent la] or incidental damages. 
•). IJLIJALTY 
Company agrees to accept penalty clause of $800.00 per day, 
Ml,000,00 pop wepk for* delays t ri meeting performance schedule In 
accordance with paragraph l^ of ^nnl rnrl, "DELAYS" . 
10. SECURITY INTEREST 
The Company reserves and the Customper igrants to the Company a 
Security Interest In the marina materials a?|d all proceeds thereof for 
the purpose of securing the balance of payments due under this 
Contrart. The Customer agrees to sign any financing statements which 
the Company deems reasonably necpssary to protect tills Security 
Interest. The Company Is also granted an irrevocable power of attorney 
to execute such financing statements on the Customer's behalf. This 
Security Interest shall terminate when the Customer has satisfied all 
of Its obligations under this Contract. 
Customer agrees to provide and prepare a suitable assembly site 
for construction according to specifications to be provided by Company 
This site will Include utilities and any special use permits, if 
-£-
needed . 
12 . SHORESIDE COSTS 
Customer agrees to assume shoreslde and bulkhead preparation costs 
associated with installation, Including utility services and gangway 
assembly. 
13. CHANGE ORDER 
Design alterations after (Purchaser's) approval of final pier and 
utility configuration will be done only through written change order. 
(Purchaser) may submit a request for change order detailing anticipated 
or desired alteration. Marinas Internationale will then inform the 
Purchaser of the Impacts, If any, of the proposed alteration on the 
cost and schedule of materials delivery. Acceptance, in writing, of 
these by (the Purchaser) will constitute an approved change order and a 
contract modification. 
IH. SALES CONTRACT SUPPLEMENT 
The Company and the Customer agree to the following additional 
contract terms and details: 
a. Customer to provide adequate security and Is responsible for 
loss due to theft or vandalism. Company is responsible for loss due to 
damage during shipping, assembly and Installation. 
b. Customer to provide electricity and lighting necessary to 
assemble during nighttime If needed to complete marina on schedule. 
c. Gale Brlmhall or other personnel as approved by Customer to 
perform monthly on-site Q.C. inspection during installation. 
d. Company agrees to provide Customer the marina anchoring system 
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at cost In an effort to save money. The price of $113f710.00 is 
Customer's estimated cost of the anchoring and agrees to pay to the 
Contractor any additional costs over $113,710.00 up to the amount of 
$215,450.00. Contractor agrees to pay for any Anchoring costs over 
$215,^50.00. 
e. The contract price of $2,083,760.00 is based upon Customer 
providing materials and services which are listed In letter from K. 
Larson to R. Ham dated 10/16/84. Company will allow further agreed 
upon deductions if Customer can provide additional materials or 
services to Company. 
15. MARKETING SUPPORT 
Company to provide marketing support and Assistance to Customer 
include: 
. National Park Service presentation 
. Display dock and pictures for use in sales 
of slips 
. A color rendering of project to be used 
for promotion and sales 
• Reasonable on-site assistance and braining 
to assist Customer in meeting their marketing 
objectives. 
16• UTILITY DESIGN 
Company agrees to prlvlde complete utility designs and 
specifications to Customer for its use in requesting quotations. 




Marinas Internationale Is herein known as COMPANY and/or CONTRACTOR. 
Forever Resorts Is herein known as CUSTOMER and/or OWNER. 
17. CONTRACT DOCUMENTS 
The Contract Documents consist of this Agreement with General 
Conditions, Supplementary and other Conditions, the Drawings, the 
Specifications, accepted alternates and all Modifications after 
execution of the Contract such as Change Orders, written 
interpretations and written orders for minor changes in the Work. The 
intent of the Contract Documents is to include all items necessary for 
the proper execution and completion of the Work. The Contract 
Documents are complementary, and what is required by any one shall be 
as binding as if required by all. Work not covered in the Contract 
Documents will not be required unless it is consistent therewith and 
reasonably Inferable therefrom as being necessary to produce the 
intended results. 
17.1 Execution of the Contract by the Company is a representation that 
the Company has visited the site and is familiar with the local 
conditions under which the Work is to be performed. 
17.2 The Work comprises the completed construction required by the 
Contract Documents and Includes all labor necessary to produce such 
construction, and all materials and equipment incorporated or to be 
incorporated in such construction. 
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18 • CUSTOMER 
If the Company falls to correct defective Work or persistently 
fails to carry out the Work In accordance with the Contract Documents, 
the Owner, by a written order, may order the Company to stop the Work, 
or any portion thereof, until the cause for such order has been 
eliminated; however, this right of the Customer to stop the Work shall 
not give rise to any duty on the part of the Owner to exercise this 
right for the benefit of the Contractor or any other person or entity. 
19. COMPANY 
The Company shall supervise and direct the Work, using the 
Company's best skill and attention, and the Company shall be solely 
responsible for all construction means, methods], techniques, sequences 
and procedures and for coordinating all portions of the Work under the 
Contract. 
19.1 Unless otherwise specifically provided in the Contract Documents, 
the Company shall provide and pay for all labor, materials, equipment, 
tools, construction equipment and machinery, water, heat, utilities, 
transportation, and other facilities and services necessary for the 
proper execution and completion of the Work, whether temporary or 
permanent and whether or not incorporated or toj be incorporated in the 
Work. 
19.2 The Company shall at all times enforce strict discipline and good 
order among the Company's employees and shall not employ on the Work, 
any unfit person or anyone not skilled in the task assigned to them. 
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19.3 The Company warrants to the Customer that all materials and 
equipment incorporated in the Work will be new unless otherwise 
specified, and that all Work will be of good quality, free from faults 
and defects and In conformance with the Contract Documents. All Work 
not conforming to these requirements may be considered defective. 
19.*4 The Company shall give all notices and comply with all laws, 
ordinances, rules, regulations, and lawful orders of any public 
authority bearing on the performance of the Work, and shall promptly 
notify the Owner if the Drawings and Specifications are at variance 
therewith. 
19.5 The Company shall be responsible to the Customer for the acts and 
omissions of the Company's employees, Subcontractors and their agents 
and employees, and other persons performing any of the Work under £ 
contract with the Company. 
19.6 The Company shall review, approve and submit all Shop Drawings, 
Product Data and Samples required by the Contract Documents. The Work 
shall be in accordance with approved submittals. 
19.7 The Contractor at all times shall keep the premises free from 
accumulation of waste materials or rubbish caused by the Company's 
operations. At the completion of the Work the Company shall remove all 
such waste materials and rubbish from and about the Project as well as 
bhe Company's tools, construction equipment, machinery and surplus 
naterials. 
L9.8 The Company shall pay all royalties and license fees; shall 
lefend all suits or claims for infringement of any patent rights and 
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shall save the Owner harmless from loss on account thereof. 
19.9 To the fullest extent permitted by law, the Company shall 
Indemnify and hold harmless the Customer and hl^ agents and employees 
from and against all claims, damages, losses ana expenses, Including 
but not limited to attorney's fees arising out of or resulting from the 
performance of the Work, provided that any such claim, damage, loss or 
expense (1) is attributable to bodily Injury, sickness, disease or 
death, or to injury to or destruction of tangible property (other than 
the Work itself) Including the loss of use resulting therefrom, and (2) 
is caused in whole or in part by any negligent gLCt or omission of the 
Company, any Subcontractor, anyone directly or indirectly employed by 
any of them or anyone for whose acts any of them may be liable. Such 
obligation shall not be construed to negate, abridge, or otherwise 
reduce any other right or obligation of indemnity which would otherwise 
exist as to any party or person described in this paragraph 19.9 in any 
and all claims against the Customer or any of his agents or employees 
by any employee of the Contractor, any Subcontractor, anyone directly 
or Indirectly employed by any of them or anyone for whose acts any of 
them may be liable, the indemnification obligation under this Paragraph 
19.9 shall not be limited in any way by any limitation on the amount or 
type of damages, compensation or benefits payable by or for the 
Contractor or any Subcontractor under Workers1 Or Workmen1s 
Compensation Acts, disability benefit acts or other employee benefit 
acts. 
19.10 Company to accept responsibility for wages, workman's 
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:ompensation, insurance, etc, a3 necessary for all personnel it 
mployees while performing assembly and Installation. Customer agrees 
o cooperate, if possible and without risk, to any assistance to 
ompany it can provide relative to conforming with State of Nevada 
ontract and labor requirements. 
0. SUBCONTRACTS 
A Subcontractor Is a person or entity who has a direct contract 
Lth the Contractor to perform any of the Work at the site. 
).l Unless otherwise required by the Contract Documents or in the 
.ddlng Documents, the Contractor, as soon as practicable after the 
rard of the Contract, shall furnish to the Owner in writing the names 
' Subcontractors for each of the principal portions of the Work. The 
ntractor shall not employ any Subcontractor to whom the Owner may 
ve a reasonable objection. The Contractor shall not be required to 
ntract with anyone to whom the Contractor has a reasonable objection, 
ntracts between the Contractor and the Subcontractors shall (1) 
quire each Subcontractor, to the extent of the Work to be performed 
the Subcontractor, to be bound to the Contractor by the terms of the 
itract Documents, and to assume toward the Contractor all the 
Ligations and responsibilities which the Contractor, by these 
juments, assumes toward the Owner and (2) allow to the Subcontractor 
? benefit of all rights, remedies and redress afforded to the 
ttractor by these Contract Documents. 
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21. WORK BY CUSTOMER OR BY SEPARATE CONTRACTORS 
The Customer reserves the right to perform1 work related to the 
Project with the Customer's own forces, and to award separate contracts 
in connection with other portions of the Project or other work on the 
site under these or similar Conditions of the Contract. 
separate contractors 
storage of their 
21.1 The Company shalL afford the Customer and 
reasonable opportunity for the introduction andj 
materials and equipment and the execution of their work, and shall 
connect and coordinate the Contractor's Work unjder this Contract with 
theirs as required by the Contract Documents. 
21.2 Any costs caused by defective or ill-time|d work shall be borne by 
the party responsible therefor. 
22. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
The Contract shall be governed by the law of the place where the 
Project is located. 
23. PAYMENTS AND COMPLETION 
Payments shall be made as provided in 4. df the Agreement. 
23.1 Payments may be withheld on account of (1) defective Work not 
remedied, (2) claims filed, (3) failure of" the Contractor to make 
payments properly to Subcontractors or for labor, materials or 
equipment, (*J) damage to the Owner or another Contractor, or (5) 
persistent failure to carry out the Work In accordance with the 
Contract Documents. 
23*2 Final payment shall not be due until the Contractor has delivered 
to the Owner a complete release of all liens arising out of this 
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Contract or receipts in full covering all labor, materials and 
equipment for which a lien could be filed, or a bond satisfactory to 
the Owner indemnifying the Owner against any lien. If any lien remains 
unsatlslfled after all payments are made, the Company shall refund to 
the Customer all monies the latter may be compelled to pay in 
discharging such lien, including all costs and reasonable attorney's 
fees . 
23*3 The making of final payment shall constitute a waiver of all 
claims by the Customer except those arising from (1) unsettled liens, 
(2) faulty or defpctive Work appearing after Substantial Completion, 
(3) failure of the Work to comply with the requirements of the Contract 
Documents, or (4) terms of any special warranties required by the 
Contract Documents. The acceptance of final payment shall constitute a 
waiver of all claims by the Contractor except those previously made in 
writing and identified by the Contractor as unsettled at the time of 
the final Application for Payment. 
24. PROTECTION OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY 
The Company shall be responsible for initiating, maintaining, and 
supervising all safety precautions and programs In connection with the 
Work. The Company shall take all reasonable precautions for the safety 
of, and shall provide all reasonable protection to prevent damage, 
injury or loss to (1) all employees on the Work and other persons who 
may be affected thereby, (2) all the Work and all materials and 
equipment to be incorporated therein, and (3) other property at the 
site or adjacent thereto. The Company shall give all notices and 
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comply with applicable laws, ordinances, rules, regulations and orders 
of any public authority bearing on the safety of persons and property 
and their protection from damage, injury or loss. The Contractor shall 
promptly remedy all damage or loss to any property caused in whole or 
In part by the Contractor, any Subcontractor, and Sub-sub-contractor, 
or anyone directly, or by anyone for whose acts any of them may be 
liable, except damage or loss attributable to the acts or omissions of 
the Owner or anyone directly employed by him or by anyone for whose 
acts either of thern may be liable, and not attributable to the fault or 
negligence of the Contractors. 
2H. CHANGES IN THE WORK 
The Owner, without invalidating the Contract, may order changes in 
the Work consisting of additions, deletions, or modifications, the 
Guaranteed Maximum Cost, if any, and the Contract Time being adjusted 
accordingly. All such changes In the Work shall be authorized by 
written Change Order signed by the Owner. 
21.1 The Guaranteed Maximum Cost, if any, and the Contract Time may be 
changed only by Change Order. 
24.2 The cost or credit to the Owner from a phange In the Work shall 
be determined by mutual agreement. 
25. TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT 
If the Contractor defaults or persistently fails or neglects to 
carry out the Work In accordance with the Contract Documents or fails 
to perform any provision of the Contract, the Owner may, after 30 day's 
wrlten notice to the Contractor, make good such deficiencies and may 
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deduct the cost thereof from the payment then or thereafter due the 
Contractor or, at the Owner's option that sufficient cause exists to 
justify such action, may terminate the Contract and take possession of 
the site and of all materials, equipment, tools, and construction 
equipment and machinery thereon owned by the Contractor and may finish 
the Work by whatever method the Owner may deem expedient; and If the 
unpaid balance of the Guaranteed Maximum Cost, If any, exceeds the 
expense of finishing the Work, such excess shall be paid to the 
Contractor, but If such expense exceeds such unpaid balance, the 
Contractor shall pay the difference to the Owner. 
26. ACCOUNTING RECORDS 
The Contractor shall check all materials, equipment and labor 
entering into the anchor/winch system and shall keep such full and 
detailed accounts as may be necessary for proper financial management 
under this Agreement. The Owner shall be afforded access to all the 
Contractor's records relating to this anchor/winch system* 
2 7. SPECIFICATIONS 
Company agrees to provide all materials In accordance with Its 
published materials specifications sheet, copy attached, 
28. ENTIRE CONTRACT 
This Contract, including the SAL$S CONTRACT SUPPLEMENT where 
applicable, constitutes the entire Contract between the Customer and 
the Company regarding the purchase of the marina materials noted above* 
This contract supercedes any prior written or oral agreements. This 
Contract may only be amended by a written instrument executed by both 
partles 
-17-
Marinas Internationale, Ltd, 
By: 
D a t e : 





Customer warrants that the 
specifications and marina plan have! 
been approve^ and are herewith 
attached. 
(initial) 
ADDENDUM "B" - MARINA MECHANICS' REQUEST FOR PAYMENT #6-Plaintiff's 
25 
8537 SCOTTISH DRIVE 
SANDY, UTAH 840^2 
(801) 942-1832 
REQUEST FOR PAYMENT # 6 
TO: MARINAS INTERNATIONALE LTD. 
457A Carlisle Drive 
Herndon, VA. ??070 
ATTEN: Tom Allgyer 
Contract Re: C ^ l l v i l l c Bny M?rin-=t/Lake Me?ri, Nevada 
D' t r ; 6-1P-85 
RF: J03 #A10l-Nev. 
DOCK ASSEMBLY BASE CONTRACT: 
ROOF ASSEMBLY BASF CONTRACT: 
ANCHORING BASE CONTRACT: 
AMENDMENT #1 BASE CONTRACT: (ANCHOR) 
BACKCHARGFS (TO 6-17-85) 
TOTAL CONTRACT TO DATE: 
MOBILIZATION 
Dock Assembly 20,000.00 
Ro>f Assembly - 0 -
Anchorine 10,000.00 
Amendment #1 5,000.00 
Backcharges - 0 -
Totsl Contract to D.He ^5,000.00 
Work Comolrtr to D^ tr T5,000.00 
Net Invoice to Date 35,000.00 




i . l [?11.00 















Duo This Invoice - 0 - 1°/,?5"V-Cj 
M -^ke Check Pryab l r t o ; MARINA MFCHANICS ENT. 
S i n c e r e l y , 
MARINA MECHANlCS^piT. 









?bl , 9 3 ^ 9 
l?O t )2?.0? 
190,52^.39 






7 / ^ 1 / . 59 




115,7?8.17 2 /9 ,99; . 57 
ADDENDUM "C" - FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE: 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL 
GEORGE A. HUNT (A1586) 
RYAN E. TIBBITTS (A4423) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD K. NEILSON, dba MARINA 
MECHANICS ENTERPRISES, and 




FOREVER LIVING PRODUCTS, INC., 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE: 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL 
Case No. C85-6367 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
This matter came on regularly before the court for a non-
jury trial on June 9, 1987, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, 
District Judge, presiding; Edwin T. Peterson of Maddox & 
I 
Snuffer appearing for plaintiff, Ronald K. ^eilson, dba Marina 
Mechanics Enterprises, (hereinafter "Neilsojn"); J. Ray Barrios 
of Mueller, Barrios & Christiansen, appearing for plaintiff 
intervenor Astro Steel Corporation, (hereinafter "Astro"); and 
George A. Hunt and Ryan E. Tibbitts of Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau appearing for defendant Forever Living Products, 
Inc., (hereinafter HFLPH); and the plaintiff and plaintiff 
intervenor having adduced evidence by way of testimony and 
documentary exhibits and having argued the matter to the court, 
and the court having reviewed the file, exhibits and memoranda 
submitted by the parties and being fully advised in the pre-
mises, and the defendant having moved for involuntary dismissal 
of the claims of plaintiff and intervenor pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. 41(b) and the court having considered arguments of 
counsel, and good cause appearing, now, therefore, the court 
hereby makes the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff Ronald K. Neilson is an individual residing 
in the State of Utah and doing business as Marina Mechanics, 
Enterprises, a sole proprietorship with its principal place of 
business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Plaintiff Intervenor, Astro Steel Corporation, is a 
Utah corporation in good standing with its principal place of 
business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
3. Defendant, Forever Living Products, Inc., is an 
Arizona corporation registered to do business in the State of 
Utah, and doing business in, among other locations, the State 
of Nevada. 
-2-
4. The claims of Neilson and Astro arose in the State of 
Nevada. 
5. On December 12, 1984, a General Construction Contract 
was entered between FLP and Marinas Internationale which 
created a direct economic relationship between them. 
6. None of the parties have adduced any evidence proving 
that FLP intentionally interfered with the contractual 
relations between Marinas Internationale and Neilson. 
7. All damages suffered by Neilson and Astro as shown by 
the evidence adduced in this action are purfely economic in 
nature. No damage to persons or property has been proved. 
8. The only evidence adduced by plaintiff to support a 
claim for damages for breach of oral contract is that FLP 
promised to "recoup Neilson*s losses.- Such representations, 
if made, constitute a promise by FLP to answer for a debt of 
Marinas Internationale. 
9. No promise was made by FLP to Astrp to pay the balance 
due Astro by Marinas Internationale. 
10. Neilson failed to pay the workman'^ compensation pre-
miums required by Nevada law long before Marinas Internationale 
declared bankruptcy on June 13, 1985. The failure to make 
i 
these required payments was the sole cause of Neilson being 
forced to leave the Callville Bay Marina construction site and 
to cease construction work in the State of Nevada. 
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11. All the work performed by Neilson after July 9, 1985, 
pursuant to the arrangement between the parties, was paid for 
in full by FLP pursuant to invoices submitted by Neilson. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court draws the 
following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The State of Nevada is the state with the most 
significant relationship to the transactions here in question. 
Therefore, Nevada law applies. 
2. FLP had a significant financial interest and its own 
contractual relationship which justified any interference with 
the Neilson-Marinas Internationale Installation Contract. 
3. The economic losses suffered by Neilson and/or Astro 
are not recoverable and do not support a claim of negligence. 
4. Any oral promises made by FLP to Neilson are barred 
pursuant to the applicable statute of frauds, Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§ 111.220 (1986), as promises to answer for the debt of another. 
5. The evidence adduced is too vague and indefinite to 
support the finding of an oral contract between the parties to 
this action. 
6. Defendant's Motion for Involuntary Dismissal should be 
granted against both plaintiff and intervenor in accordance 
herewith and an appropriate Judgment of Dismissal entered. 
-4-
DATED this day of August, 19817. 
Timothy R. Hanson 
District C^ ourt Judge 
SCMCLERK17 
-5-
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) s s . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Lynn Frear, being duly sworn, says that she i s employed in the 
law o f f i c e s of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for d e f e n d a n t 
herein; that she served the attached FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL 
(Case No. C 8 5 - 6 3 6 7 S a l t Lake County) upon the parties 
l i s t e d below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope 
addressed to : 
J . Ray B a r r i o s 
MUELLER, BARRIOS & CHRISTIANSEN 
777 Clark Learning O f f i c e Center 
175 South West Temple i 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8410][ 
Denver C. Snuffer 
MADDOX & SNUFFER 
64 Eas t 6400 South, S u i t e 120 
Murray, Utah 84107 
HAND DELIVERED 
and causing the same to be marri«eti7 fix bcnrl7resr"PP?ra^Er prepaid 7 on the 




SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 3lst day of July 
19_S7 
My commission expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
7 / / ^ / i f f Residing in S|alt Lake County, Utah 
ADDENDUM "D" - AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
GEORGE A. HUNT (A1586) 
RYAN E. TIBBITTS (A4423) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD K. NEILSON, dba MARINA 
MECHANICS ENTERPRISES, and 




FOREVER LIVING PRODUCTS, INC., Case No. C85-6367 
Defendant. Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
This matter came on regularly before the court for a non-
jury trial on June 9, 1987, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, 
Utah State District Judge, presiding; Edwin T. Peterson of 
Maddox & Snuffer appearing for plaintiff, Ronald K. Neilson, 
dba Marina Mechanics Enterprises, (hereinafter "Neilson"); J. 
Ray Barrios of Mueller, Barrios & Christiansen, appearing for 
plaintiff intervener Astro Steel Corporation, (hereinafter 
"Astro"); and George A. Hunt and Ryan E. Tibbitts of Snow, 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Christensen & Martineau appearing for defendant Forever Living 
Products, Inc., (hereinafter "FLP"); and the parties having 
adduced evidence by way of testimony and documentary exhibits 
and having argued the matter to the court, and the court having 
reviewed the file, exhibits and memoranda submitted by the 
parties and being fully advised in the premises, and good cause 
appearing, now, therefore, the court hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On April 29, 1982, FLP entered into a Concessionaire's 
Lease with the United States of America, Department of the 
Interior to act as a concessionaire on United States government 
property. This property is located at Callville Bay in the 
Lake Mead National Recreation area, within the State of Nevada. 
2. Paragraph 20 of the Department of Interior Lease pro-
vided the United States Secretary of the Interior with the 
option of requiring a completion bond for any construction work 
performed on their leased Callville Bay property. 
3. The United States Secretary of the Interior did not, 
at any time, require a completion bond for any work relating to 
the Callville Bay Marina. 
4. The only third party benefits claimed by Neilson and 
Astro under the Department of Interior lease were those alleged-
ly provided under paragraph 20 of the lease. 
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5. On December 14, 1984, FLP entered into a General 
Construction Contract with Marinas Internationale, a Virginia 
corporation, for construction of a marina on Callville Bay, 
Lake Mead, Nevada. 
6. The base dollar amount for the construction of the 
marina per the General Contract between FLP and Marinas 
Internationale was $2,083,760.00. The General Contract also 
contained a mechanism whereby Marinas Internationale was to be 
paid an amount for anchoring the dock system, based upon actual 
cost, but not to exceed $101,740.00. 
7. The General Contract between FLP and Marinas 
Internationale provided that the marina was to be completed no 
later than June 12, 1985. 
8- On March 1, 1985, Marinas Internationale entered into 
a subcontract with Neilson, entitled "Installation Contract", 
whereby plaintiff was to perform services relative to the con-
struction of the marina. 
9. The Installation Contract between Marinas 
Internationale and Neilson required Marinas Internationale to 
pay $150,696.00 for the installation of the dock, which was 
based on a price of $1.75 per square foot for 86,112 square 
feet of dock. The Installation Contract further required 
Neilson* s work to be completed by May 31, 1985, incorporated by 
reference the provisions of the contract between FLP and 
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Marinas Internationale, and required Neilson to be bound 
thereby. 
10. On March 11, 1985, Neilson began to perform as subcon-
tractor at Callville Bay in the assembling and construction of 
the marina's floating dock system. 
11. On March 28, 1985, a change order to the contract 
between Marinas Internationale and Neilson was issued requiring 
Neilson to fabricate and provide certain anchor blocks on the 
marina at an additional cost to Marinas Internationale of 
$41,211.00 
12. Beginning with the original down payment in December 
of 1984, and continuing through February, March, April, May and 
to June 10, 1985, FLP paid a total of $2,109,168.50 to Marinas 
Internationale for materials and labor involved in the construc-
tion of the marina. 
13. On June 13, 1985, Marinas Internationale, the general 
contractor, filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the United 
States Bankruptcy Code. FLP had no prior knowledge or warning 
of this action. 
14. After the bankruptcy filing, Neilson refused to 
perform further work unless some measures were taken to ensure 
payment to him for such work. On June 21, 1985, a joint 
accommodation was reached among Neilson, FLP, and Marinas 
Internationale whereby Neilson would be paid by joint check 
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(payable to Neilson and Marinas Internationale) based upon time 
and material invoices to be submitted. Neilson proceeded and 
continued to perform work on this basis until August 26, 1985, 
when he was ousted from the project for nonpayment of State 
insurance fees. 
15. On July 9, 1985, a severe storm arose in the Lake Mead 
area and extensively damaged the marina, vhich was still under 
construction at the time. 
16. On July 15th, FLP met with Neilson and discussed storm 
damage repair work. Prior to the storm, FLP had paid a total 
of $52,132.70 in joint checks to Marinas Internationale/ 
Neilson. 
17. On August 26, 1985, Neilson was ordered to cease per-
forming construction work in Nevada by the State Industrial 
Insurance System of Nevada for nonpayment sof insurance pre-
miums. Thereafter, the remaining marina construction and storm 
damage repair work was completed by FLP using its own work 
forces. 
18. On October 26, 1985, the Department of the Interior 
acknowledged completion and gave approval to open approximately 
one-half of the slips at the Callville Bay marina. 
19. On January 6, 1986, the Department of the Interior, 
National Park Service, acknowledged completion of and qave its 
approval to open the completed marina. 
-5-
20. FLP suffered significant economic loss in the form of 
additional project completion expenses and lost profits from 
slip rentals and other sources. 
21. In addition to payments for storm damage repair, FLP 
paid the following amounts for the construction of the Marina: 
$2,109,168.50 Total of checks paid to Marinas 
Internationale prior to the bankruptcy 
filing. 
52,132.70 Total of joint checks paid prior to the 
storm of 7/9/85 
70,000.00 Paid to Jessop Bros. Construction Co. 
for erection of Marina roof. 
36,000.00 Paid by FLP to B&C Steel for the final 
truck load of steel. 
$2,267,301.20 Total paid by FLP for completion of 
Marina, exclusive of payments for storm 
damage. 
22. The agreement between FLP and Marinas Internationale 
contained provisions for the benefit of materialmen such as 
intervenor Astro Steel and such persons were intended third 
party beneficiaries of said contract. 
23. The damages sustained by Astro Steel which are 
supported by the evidence amount to the sum of $101,300.00, 
together with prejudgment interest thereon. 
24. Pursuant to the provisions of the agreement between 
FLP and Marinas Internationale, FLP is entitled to liquidated 
damages thereunder for late/noncompletion of the marina 
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construction project, which, together with the economic loss 
set forth in Finding of Fact 20 (above), more than offset the 
damage sustained by Astro Steel. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the court draws the 
following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. A binding contract existed between defendant FLP and 
the United States Department of Interior. 
2. A binding contract existed between FLP and Marinas 
Internationale. 
3. A binding contract existed between Marinas 
Internationale and Neilson. 
4. Any rights and/or obligations which existed between 
FLP and Neilson were covered by express written agreements 
which preclude any recovery by Neilson based upon a theory of 
unjust enrichment. 
5. The record contains insufficient evidence for the 
court to determine damages attributable to a claim of unjust 
enrichment by Neilson. 
6. FLP paid a substantial sum for completion of the 
Callville Bay marina and therefore has not been unjustly 
enriched by either Neilson or Astro. 
7. Under the terms of the Installation Contract, Neilson 
agreed to assume all the obligations that Marinas Internationale 
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had to FLP. The defenses and liquidated damages available to 
FLP under the General Contract excuse FLP from any perform-
ance or obligation to Neilson as a third party beneficiary and 
preclude any recovery by Neilson. 
8. Both Neilson and Astro, by claiming third party bene-
ficiary status, assume the rights and obligations of Marinas 
Internationale and subject themselves to all defenses available 
to FLP under the terms of the General Contract. Marinas 
Internationale is in material breach of the General Contract 
entered into with FLP. FLP is thereby excused from any further 
performance. Therefore, neither Neilson nor Astro may recover 
as third party beneficiaries to the general contract. 
9. The liquidated and other damages available to FLP 
under the general contract offset any third party benefits 
claimed by Astro. 
10. Defendant should be awarded a judgment in its favor 
and against both plaintiff and intervenor in accordance 
herewith. / 
DATED this day of September, 1987. 
'iraothy R. Hanson 
'District Court Judge 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
MUELLER, BARRIOS S. CHRISTIANSEN 
By 
J. Barrios 
Attorneys for Intervenor 
MADDOX S. SNUFFER 
By 
Edwin T. Peterson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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